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Still Bleak for 2002
Economic growth along the Texas Gulf Coast
is now slowing rapidly. Weak demand for oil and
natural gas, both at home and abroad, has put
downward pressure on oil and gas prices and
taken the steam out of drilling and oil exploration
activity. The domestic rig count, which rose to
1,278 in July, has fallen to near 1,000 working rigs
in recent weeks and seems likely to decline fur-
ther as we enter the coming year. This loss of
momentum in drilling removes the single factor
that has kept Houston and the Gulf Coast grow-
ing, even as the U.S. and global economies moved
to the brink of recession. 
This article looks at the other end of the oil
industry—the downstream petrochemical and re-
fining industries and particularly petrochemicals.
The economics here are the reverse of upstream,
where falling energy prices reduce exploration act-
ivity. In contrast, falling energy prices are good
news downstream. They reduce the cost of feed-
stock and of energy used to run chemical proc-
esses and often result in higher profits and a wave
of capacity expansion. Over long periods, the com-
bination of upstream drilling and downstream
chemicals and refining provides a nice balance to
the Gulf Coast regional economy.
As oil and gas prices weaken, can downstream
profits and related construction provide a significant
boost to the regional economy? Unfortunately, the
answer is no, at least not through next year. The
advantages of lower feedstock costs are not enough
to offset weak demand and serious overcapacity
for many petrochemicals. Despite the decline of
natural gas prices to the $2–$3 range, the outlook
is for weak petrochemical profits and limited ex-
pansion in 2002. pipeline system, and cheap, plentiful storage
capacity in salt caverns. However, assuming
that world oil markets were to remain in their
historical range of $17–$22, a natural gas price
of $3–$4 would provide rough parity between
natural gas and naphtha for the production of
ethylene, for example, and take away any U.S.
feedstock cost advantage based on natural gas.  
How much have Gulf Coast chemical pro-
ducers benefited from the recent fall in natural
gas prices? Table 1 shows the cost of produc-
ing ethylene, the key chemical building block
on the Gulf Coast, from either natural gas-based
ethane or light naphtha. As the price of natural
gas fell from near $5 in May to near $2 in Sep-
tember, the cost advantage returned to ethane
by July. However, the combination of an Octo-
ber rise in gas prices to $3 (following a forecast
of cold winter weather) and a decrease in
crude oil prices from $30 per barrel to $20 (as
prospects for economic growth dimmed after
the Sept. 11 attacks) pushed the advantage back
to the oil side. Somewhat surprisingly, despite
the long slide in natural gas prices, ethane is
again at a cost disadvantage relative to naph-
tha. It is not the price of natural gas but the
price of gas relative to oil that counts. 
Does the inventory buildup over the sum-
mer indicate that the overhang in gas produc-
tion capacity has returned? Is the gas bubble
back? All the data are not in, but what are
available indicate that most of the gas that
went into storage this summer was the result of
a weak economy, not a surge in supplies from
new gas reserves. It seems likely this current
gas glut can be cured with a rebound in U.S.
economic growth, presumably in a matter of
months and not the years that were needed to
work off the gas surplus of the 1990s.
OVERCAPACITY 
Current high levels of overcapacity in the
U.S. petrochemical industry are the product of
FEEDSTOCK PRICES
Last winter, some of the coldest weather of
the previous 100 years put natural gas prices on
a wild ride. In January, prices received by Gulf
Coast gas producers briefly pushed to near $10
per million Btu (MMBtu) and remained above
$5 for most of the heating season. The deregula-
tion of natural gas in the late 1980s left a sub-
stantial oversupply of gas production capacity in
the United States, and the typical price remained
near $2 per MMBtu for much of the decade.
Demand for natural gas grew rapidly in the
late 1990s, however, led by a strong economy,
by the fuel’s environmentally friendly features
and especially by its use in electric power pro-
duction. The winter price spike of 2000–01
was widely read by many as the end of the nat-
ural gas glut in the United States and the begin-
ning of a new era of higher natural gas prices,
needed to bring new reserves into production. 
Natural gas prices, however, have steadily
weakened throughout this year, and invento-
ries have risen to the highest levels of the past
decade. From May to September, natural gas
was injected into storage at rates 53 percent
higher than last year and 39 percent higher than
1999. Working gas in storage in October was
15.6 percent higher than last year, according to
the Department of Energy. These growing inven-
tories pushed gas prices below $4 in May,
below $3 in August and briefly below $2 in
October. Forecasts of another very cold winter
have now pulled gas prices back near $3. 
U.S. and Canadian petrochemical produc-
ers have historically relied on relatively cheap
and abundant natural gas liquids as an impor-
tant competitive advantage over the rest of the
world. Outside North America, petrochemicals
are typically produced from naphtha, a light dis-
tillate found in oil. Naphtha’s price is set in
world oil markets. For much of the 1990s, the
price advantage between natural gas liquids (with
prices highly correlated to natural gas) and
naphtha (correlated to oil) fell squarely in favor
of natural gas. The typical price ratio in the
1990s was 10:1 (for example, $20 per barrel for
oil and $2 per MMBtu for gas), yielding sub-
stantially more raw material per dollar from gas. 
The run-up in natural gas prices last winter
seemed to threaten the existing competitive
balance between U.S. producers and the rest of
the world. A U.S. location brings many advan-
tages beyond price: access to the world’s larg-
est market, political stability, a highly developed
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SOURCE: CMAI, Inc.two factors: the quantity of chemicals shipped
is shrinking along with the U.S. industrial sector,
and new capacity is coming online. Keeping our
ethylene example, Figure 1 shows long-term
trends in both ethylene capacity and the quan-
tity of ethylene sold to customers each year. U.S.
ethylene shipments peaked at 56 billion pounds
in 1999, after averaging annual growth rates of
4.8 percent during 1990–99. Ethylene capacity in
1999 was in balance at 58 billion pounds. 
In 2000, U.S. ethylene markets shrank by
1.5 percent, to 55 billion pounds, and in 2001
they may shrink by nearly 10 percent, to 50 bil-
lion pounds. Meanwhile, ethylene capacity is
growing in the United States, the product of a
number of projects announced in the late 1990s
and only now coming onstream. By the end of
this year, capacity will reach 62 billion pounds,
leaving nearly 20 percent of U.S. capacity idle. 
The immediate effect of this overcapacity
has been to drive profit margins to very low lev-
els. As Table 1 indicates, the cost of producing
ethylene fell by nearly one-third between May and
October as the cost of natural gas came down.
However, the glut of capacity meant that pro-
ducers were unable to hold on to any of the
increased profit margins because ethylene’s
price fell as quickly as the cost of production. 
Restoring balance between capacity and
the quantity of ethylene demanded will not come
easily or quickly. Perhaps the most certain ele-
ment in filling the gap is the recovery of the
U.S. economy, although the timing and pace of
recovery are still unknown. Although the events
of Sept. 11 have clouded our crystal balls, we
still have every reason to expect solid U.S. eco-
nomic growth to resume next year. 
The last comparable glut of ethylene over-
capacity came in the early 1980s (see Figure 1),
and it was in large part managed by the closure
of a number of older, inefficient facilities. In
fact, it was 1989 before capacity returned to
the 1980 preclosure levels. Closures are also
likely to play a significant role in eliminating
excess capacity this time.
Poor profits will make routine maintenance
decisions difficult for older and inefficient
plants. In the Houston–Galveston and Beau-
mont–Port Arthur areas, plant closures are likely
to be accelerated by the recent adoption of a
state implementation plan to comply with air
quality standards for ozone by 2007. Although
the plan still lacks final Environmental Protec-
tion Agency approval, its goal is to reduce
plant emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOX) by
90 percent except in grandfathered plants built
before 1971, where the targeted emission re-
duction is 50 percent. Credits for NOX reduc-
tions can be earned through the shutdown of
older, less efficient plants and then applied to
other facilities to reduce the cost of their NOX
compliance. With some companies facing bills
well in excess of $100 million to bring their
southeast Texas plants into compliance, hard
decisions are likely to be made and plants closed. 
Finally, the current pace of expansion of
new facilities is running at a very low level.
Figure 2 shows the number of new hydrocar-
bon processing projects announced in Texas
and Louisiana from 1986 through the present.
Since 1997–98, the number of projects has
Figure 2
New Hydrocarbon Project Announcements 
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Figure 1
U.S. Ethylene Capacity, 1980–2001
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T he Houston economy continues to slow.
Over the past six months, job growth has
fallen to a 1.5 percent annual rate. Since July
the Baker Hughes rig count has dropped by
nearly 300 working rigs, clearly demonstrat-
ing that the drilling boom is over. The Hous-
ton Purchasing Managers Index, which has
lost 10 points in the last three months, indi-
cates that local mining and manufacturing are
shrinking for the first time in two years. 
RETAIL AND AUTO SALES
Department stores report that they are
steadily falling behind plan and that sales are
running 4 to 5 percent below expectations.
Furniture stores also saw sales soften in Octo-
ber as the effects of Tropical Storm Allison
began to fade. Food stores report a surge in
sales because consumers are eating out less
and eating in more. October auto sales set a
record, thanks to zero percent financing and
other consumer incentives. Year-to-date sales
are now equal to last year’s record pace. 
ENERGY PRICES 
Crude oil prices moved in a narrow range
near $21–$22 throughout October. Price
movements were primarily in response to
speculation about OPEC production cuts. Mar-
kets have also become sensitive to economic
news since Sept. 11, with fears that a global
recession will bring a collapse in oil demand.
Crude, gasoline and distillate inventories all
rose during October. Jet fuel demand fell 15
percent below year-earlier levels. It now
seems to have stabilized and may even have
been turning around in late October. 
As a result of weak demand and high
inventories, the price of natural gas slipped
briefly under $2 per MMBtu in late Septem-
ber. The price bounced sharply to over $3
after a long-range forecast of a very cold 
winter, then fell back as weather turned un-
seasonably warm across the country. 
REFINING AND PETROCHEMICALS
Refiners increased output as the fall turn-
around season passed. Profit margins fell slightly
in October from September’s moderate levels.
By late October, crude prices had stabilized
and product prices were continuing to fall,
putting more downward pressure on margins.
Petrochemical producers saw little change in
their situation. A combination of weak de-
mand and a large overhang of capacity kept
profits depressed. Lower natural gas prices re-
duced costs, but overcapacity meant the cost
savings were simply passed on to customers. 
DRILLING AND OIL SERVICES
Conditions continue to weaken in the oil
service industry. The number of rigs working
in the United States slid to near 1,000 by early
November, and prices for oil services have
come under pressure. Day rates for rigs work-
ing shallow gulf waters have collapsed. Work
in deeper waters, as well as foreign drilling
activity, continues at a healthy pace, helping
maintain oil service company revenues. These
companies are delaying layoffs in hope that a
quick rebound in the U.S. economy will re-
vive natural gas demand and boost gas prices.
trended steadily downward to its current low
level. For ethylene, only three recent expan-
sion announcements are in the works, with
none coming online after 2004. 
This low level of petrochemical and other
downstream construction leaves a significant
void in the Texas Gulf Coast’s economic out-
look. Downstream petrochemical plants are
normally a dominant feature of the region’s
heavy construction. The bleak near-term out-
look for petrochemical construction in 2002 is
simply one more reflection of the industry’s
current poor profitability and cash flows, with
few prospects for a near-term turnaround. 
—Mark Eramo, Robert W. Gilmer
and Arved Teleki 
Eramo is director of light olefins and Teleki is
chief economist at CMAI, Inc., Houston.
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